In the early 1940s, Haavelmo proposed a probabilistic structure for econometric modeling, aiming to make econometrics useful for public decision making. His fundamental contribution has become thoroughly embedded in subsequent econometric research, yet it could not fully answer all the deep issues that the author raised. Notably, Haavelmo struggled to formalize the implications for decision making of the fact that models can at most approximate actuality. In the same period, Wald initiated his own seminal development of statistical decision theory. Haavelmo favorably cited Wald, but econometrics subsequently did not embrace statistical decision theory. Instead, it focused on study of identification, estimation, and statistical inference. This paper proposes statistical decision theory as a framework for evaluation of the performance of models in decision making. I particularly consider the common practice of as-if optimization: specification of a model, point estimation of its parameters, and use of the point estimate to make a decision that would be optimal if the estimate were accurate. A central theme is that one should evaluate as-if optimization or any other model-based decision rule by its performance across the state space, not the model space. I use prediction and treatment choice to illustrate. Statistical decision theory is conceptually simple, but application is often challenging. Advancement of computation is the primary task to continue building the foundations sketched by Haavelmo and Wald.
economic research, if its results are to be the basis for economic policy upon which might depend billions of dollars of national income and the general economic welfare of millions of people?"
Haavelmo's thesis made fundamental contributions that became thoroughly embedded in subsequent econometric research. Nevertheless, it is unsurprising to find that it did not fully answer all the deep issues that the author raised. Notably, Haavelmo struggled to formalize the implications for decision making of the fact that models can at most seek to approximate actuality. He called attention to the broad issue in his opening chapters on "Abstract Models and Reality" and "The Degree of Permanence of Economic Laws," but the later chapters did not resolve the matter.
Haavelmo devoted a long chapter to "The Testing of Hypotheses," expositing the then recent work of Neyman-Pearson and considering its potential use to evaluate the consistency of models with observed sample data. Testing models subsequently became widespread in economics, both as a topic of study in econometric theory and as a practice in empirical research. However, Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing does not provide satisfactory guidance for decision making. See Section 2.3 below.
While Haavelmo was writing his thesis, Abraham Wald was initiating his own seminal development of statistical decision theory in Wald (1939 Wald ( , 1945 and elsewhere, which later culminated in his own treatise (Wald, 1950 ). Wald's work has broad potential application. Indeed, it implicitly provides an appealing formal framework for evaluation of the use of models in decision making. I say that Wald "implicitly" provides this framework because, writing in an abstract mathematical manner, he appears not to have explicitly examined decision making with models. Yet it is conceptually straightforward to use statistical decision theory in this way. Explaining this motivates the present paper.
I find it intriguing to join the contributions of Haavelmo and Wald because these pioneering econometrician and statistician interacted to a considerable degree in the United States during the wartime period when both were developing their ideas. Wald came to the U.S. in 1938 as a refugee from Austria.
Haavelmo did so in 1939 for what was intended to be a short-term professional visit, but which lasted the entire war when he was unable to return to occupied Norway. Bjerkholt (2007 Bjerkholt ( , 2015 , in biographical essays on Haavelmo's period in the United States, describes the many interactions of Haavelmo and Wald, not only at professional conferences but also in hiking expeditions in Colorado and Maine. Bjerkholt observes that Haavelmo visited Neyman as well, the latter being in Berkeley by then.
Haavelmo's appreciation of Wald is clear. In the preface of Haavelmo (1944) , he wrote (p. v):
"My most sincere thanks are due to Professor Abraham Wald of Columbia University for numerous suggestions and for help on many points in preparing the manuscript. Upon his unique knowledge of modern statistical theory and mathematics in general I have drawn very heavily. Many of the statistical sections in this study have been formulated, and others have been reformulated, after discussions with him."
The text of the thesis cites several of Wald's papers. Most relevant is the final chapter on "Problems of Prediction," where Haavelmo suggests application of the framework in Wald (1939) to choose a predictor of a future random outcome. I discuss this in Section 3.3 below. Despite Haavelmo's favorable citations of Wald=s ideas, econometrics in the period following publication of Haavelmo (1944) did not embrace statistical decision theory. Instead, it focused on study of identification, estimation, and statistical inference. None of the contributions in the seminal Cowles Monograph 10 (Koopmans, 1950) mentions statistical decision theory. Only one does so briefly in Cowles Monograph 14 ). This appears in a chapter by Koopmans and Hood (1953) , who refer to estimates of structural parameters as "raw materials, to be processed further into solutions of a wide variety of prediction problems." See Section 3.3 for further discussion.
Modern econometricians continue to view parameter estimates as "raw materials" that may be used to solve prediction and other decision problems. A widespread practice has been as-if optimization: specification of a model, point estimation of its parameters, and use of the point estimate to make a decision that would be optimal if the estimate were accurate. As-if optimization has heuristic appeal when a model is known to be correct, less so when the model may be incorrect.
A huge hole in econometric theory has been the absence of a well-grounded mechanism to evaluate the performance of as-if optimization and other uses of possibly incorrect econometric models in decision making. This paper proposes statistical decision theory as a framework for evaluation of the performance of models in decision making. I set forth the general idea and give illustrative applications. Section 2 reviews the core elements of statistical decision theory and uses choice between two actions to illustrate. The basic idea is simple, although it may be challenging to implement. One specifies a state space, listing all the states of nature that one believes feasible. One considers alternative statistical decision functions (SDFs), which map potentially observed data into decisions. In the frequentist statistics manner, one evaluates an SDF in each state of nature ex ante, by its mean performance across repeated samples. The true state of nature is not known. Hence, one evaluates the performance of an SDF across all the elements of the state space.
I discuss three decision criteria that have drawn much attention: maximization of subjective expected welfare (aka minimization of Bayes risk), the maximin criterion, and the minimax-regret criterion.
Minimization of Bayes risk and conditional Bayes decision making are mathematically equivalent in some contexts, but it is important not to conflate the two ideas. The maximin and minimax-regret criteria coincide in special cases, but they are generally distinct.
Section 3 shows how the Wald framework may be used to evaluate decision making with models.
One specifies a model space, which simplifies or approximates the state space in some manner. A modelbased decision uses the model space as if it were the state space. I particularly consider the use of models to perform as-if optimization. A central theme is that one should evaluate as-if optimization or any other model-based decision rule by its performance across the state space, not the model space. In this way, statistical decision theory embraces use of both correct and incorrect models to make decisions. I use prediction of a real-valued outcome to illustrate, summarizing recent work in Dominitz and Manski (2017) and Manski and Tabord-Meehan (2017) .
To illustrate further, Section 4 considers use of the empirical success (ES) rule in treatment choice.
Recent econometric research has shown that this application of as-if optimization is well-grounded in statistical decision theory when the data are generated by an ideal randomized trial; see Manski (2004 Manski ( , 2005 , Porter (2009, 2019) , Stoye (2009 Stoye ( , 2012 , Tetenov (2016, 2019) , and Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018) . When the ES rule is used with observational data, it exemplifies a controversial modeling practice, wherein one assumes without good justification that realized treatments are statistically independent of treatment response. Decision-theoretic analysis shows when use of the ES rule with observational data does and does not yield desirable treatment choices.
Although statistical decision theory is conceptually simple, application is computationally challenging in many contexts. Section 5 cites advancement of computation as the primary task to continue building the foundations sketched by Haavelmo and Wald. Considered broadly, this paper adds to the argument that I have made beginning in Manski (2000 Manski ( , 2004 Manski ( , 2005 and then in a sequence of subsequent articles for application of statistical decision theory to econometrics. A small group of other econometricians have made their own recent contributions towards this objective. I have already cited some work on prediction and treatment choice. Athey and Wager (2019) make further contributions on treatment choice. Chamberlain (2000 Chamberlain ( , 2007 and Chamberlain and Moreira (2009) have used statistical decision theory to study estimation of various linear econometric models.
The new contributions made here are varied. Interpretative discussion of the history of econometric thought permeates the paper. The general idea proposed in Section 3 ---evaluation of model-based decision rules by their performance across the state space rather the model space ---may be thought obvious in retrospect. Yet it appears not to have been studied previously. Earlier work using statistical decision theory to evaluate model-based decisions has generally assumed that the model is correct, so the model space is the state space. The paper also contributes some new analysis of treatment choice in Section 4.
Statistical Decision Theory: Concepts and Practicalities
The Wald development of statistical decision theory directly addresses decision making with sample data. Wald began with the standard decision theoretic problem of a planner (equivalently, decision maker or agent) who must choose an action yielding welfare that depends on an unknown state of nature.
The planner specifies a state space listing the states that he considers possible. He must choose an action without knowing the true state.
Wald added to this standard problem by supposing that the planner observes sample data that may be informative about the true state. He studied choice of a statistical decision function (SDF), which maps each potential data realization into a feasible action. He proposed evaluation of SDFs as procedures, chosen prior to observation of the data, specifying how a planner would use whatever data may be realized. Thus, Wald=s theory is frequentist.
I describe general decision problems without sample data in Section 2.1 and with such data in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 examines the important special case of decisions that choose between two actions. Section 2.4 discusses the practical issues that challenge application of statistical decision theory.
Decisions Under Uncertainty
Consider a planner who must choose an action yielding welfare that varies with the state of nature.
The planner has an objective function and beliefs about the true state. These are considered primitives. He must choose an action without knowing the true state. The choice set is commonly considered to be predetermined. The welfare function and the state space are subjective. The former formalizes what the planner wants to achieve and the latter expresses the states of nature he believes could possibly occur.
As far as I am aware, Wald did not address how a planner might formalize a welfare function and state space in practice. I find it interesting to mention that Frisch proposed late in his career that econometricians wanting to help planners make policy decisions might perform what is now called statedpreference elicitation; see, for example, Ben-Akiva, McFadden, and Train (2019) . In a lecture titled "Cooperation between Politicians and Econometricians on the Formalization of Political Preferences," Frisch (1971) proposed that an econometrician could elicit the "preference function" of a politician by posing a sequence of hypothetical policy-choice scenarios and asking the politician to choose between the policy options specified in each scenario.
While the state space ultimately is subjective, its structure may use observed data that are informative about features of the true state. This idea is central to econometric analysis of identification.
Haavelmo's formalization of econometrics initially considers the state space to be a set of probability distributions that one thinks may possibly describe the economic system under study. The Koopmans (1949) formalization of identification contemplates unlimited data collection that enables one to shrink the state space, eliminating distributions that are inconsistent with the information revealed by observation.
Koopmans put it this way (p. 132):
"we shall base our discussion on a hypothetical knowledge of the probability distribution of the observations . . . . Such knowledge is the limit approachable but not attainable by extended observation. By hypothesizing nevertheless the full availability of such knowledge, we obtain a clear separation between problems of statistical inference arising from the variability of finite samples, and problems of identification in which we explore the limits to which inference even from an infinite number of observations is suspect."
In modern econometric language, the true state of nature is point identified if the contemplated observational process eliminates all but one probability distribution for the economic system. It is partially identified if observation eliminates some but not all the distributions initially deemed possible.
Given a welfare function and state space, a close to universally accepted prescription for decision making is that choice should respect dominance. Action c ∈ C is weakly dominated if there exists a d ∈ C such that w(d, s) ≥ w(c, s) for all s ∈ S and w(d, s) > w(c, s) for some s ∈ S. Even though the true state s * is unknown, choice of d is certain to weakly improve on choice of c.
There is no clearly best way to choose among undominated actions, but decision theorists have not wanted to abandon the idea of optimization. So they have proposed various ways of using the objective function w(A, ·) to form functions of actions alone, which can be optimized. In principle one should only consider undominated actions, but it may be difficult to determine which actions are undominated. Hence, it is common to optimize over the full set of feasible actions. I define decision criteria accordingly in this paper. I also use max and min notation, without concern for the mathematical subtleties that sometime make it necessary to suffice with sup and inf operations.
One broad idea is to place a subjective probability distribution on the state space, average statedependent welfare with respect to this distribution and maximize the resulting function. This yields maximization of subjective average welfare. Let π be the specified distribution on S. For each feasible action c, w(c, s)dπ is the mean of w(c, s) with respect to π. The criterion solves the problem (1) max ∫w(c, s)dπ. The MMR criterion chooses an action that minimizes the maximum loss to welfare that can result from not knowing the true state. An MMR choice solves the problem
is the regret of action c in state of nature s; that is, the welfare loss associated with choice of c relative to an action that maximizes welfare in state s. The true state being unknown, one evaluates c by its maximum regret over all states and selects an action that minimizes maximum regret. The maximum regret of an action measures its maximum distance from optimality across all states. Hence, an MMR choice is uniformly nearest to optimal among all feasible actions.
A planner who asserts a partial subjective distribution on the states of nature could maximize minimum subjective average welfare or minimize maximum average regret. These hybrid criteria combine elements of averaging across states and concern with uniform performance across states. Hybrid criteria have drawn attention in decision theory. However, I will confine discussion to the polar cases in which the planner asserts a complete subjective distribution or none.
Statistical Decision Problems
Statistical decision problems add to the above structure by supposing that the planner observes finite-sample data generated by some sampling distribution. Sample data may be informative but, unlike the unlimited data contemplated in identification analysis, they do not enable one to shrink the state space.
In practice, knowledge of the sampling distribution is generally incomplete. To express this, one extends the concept of the state space S to list the set of feasible sampling distributions, denoted (Q s , s ∈ S). Let Ψ s denote the sample space in state s; that is, Ψ s is the set of samples that may be drawn under sampling distribution Q s . The literature typically assumes that the sample space does not vary with s and is known. I maintain this assumption and denote the known sample space as Ψ, without the s subscript. Then a statistical decision function c(@): Ψ ⇾ C maps the sample data into a chosen action.
Wald's concept of a statistical decision function embraces all mappings of the form [data → action].
An SDF need not perform inference; that is, it need not use data to draw conclusions about the true state of nature. None of the prominent decision criteria that have been studied from Wald=s perspective −− maximin, minimax-regret, and maximization of subjective average welfare −− refer to inference. The general absence of inference in statistical decision theory is striking and has been noticed; see Neyman (1962) He went on to write (p. 29): "A reasonable rule is one that is better than just guessing."
Statistical decision theory has mainly studied the same decision criteria as has decision theory without sample data. Let Γ be a specified set of feasible SDFs, each mapping Ψ ⇾ C. The statistical versions of decision criteria (1), (2), and (3) are
I discuss these criteria below, focusing on (4) and (6).
Bayes Decisions
Considering contexts where one wants to minimize loss rather than maximize welfare, research in statistical decision theory often refers to criterion (4) as minimization of Bayes risk. This term may seem odd given the absence of any reference in (4) to Bayesian inference. Criterion (4) simply places a subjective distribution on the state space and optimizes the resulting subjective average welfare.
Justification for use of the word Bayes when considering (4) rests on an important mathematical result relating this criterion to conditional Bayes decision making. The conditional Bayes approach calls on one to first perform Bayesian inference, which uses the likelihood function for the observed data to transform the prior distribution on the state space into a posterior distribution, without reference to a decision problem. One then chooses an action that maximizes posterior subjective average welfare. See, for example, the classic text of DeGroot (1970) or more recent discussions of applications to randomized trials in articles such as Spiegelhalter, Freedman, and Parmar (1994) and Scott (2010).
As described above, conditional Bayes decision making is unconnected to Wald's frequentist statistical decision theory. However, suppose that the set of feasible statistical decision functions is unconstrained and that certain regularity conditions hold. Then it follows from Fubini's Theorem that the conditional Bayes decision for each possible data realization solves Wald's problem of maximization of subjective average welfare. See Berger (1985, Section 4.4 .1) for general analysis and Chamberlain (2007) for application to a linear econometric model with instrumental variables. On the other hand, Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018) and Athey and Wager (2019) study important classes of treatment-choice problems in which the set of feasible decision functions is constrained. Hence, Wald's criterion (4) need not yield the same actions as conditional Bayes decision making in these settings.
The equivalence of Wald's decision criterion (4) and conditional Bayes decisions is a mathematical result that holds under specified conditions. Philosophical advocates of the conditional Bayes paradigm go beyond the mathematics. They assert as a self-evident axiom that decision making should condition on observed data and should not perform frequentist thought experiments that contemplate how statistical decision functions perform in repeated sampling; see, for example, Berger (1985, Chapter 1).
Considering the mathematical equivalence of minimization of Bayes risk and conditional Bayes decisions, Berger asserts that that the conditional Bayes perspective is normatively "correct" and that the Wald frequentist perspective is "bizarre." He states (p. 160):
"Note that, from the conditional perspective together with the utility development of loss, the correct way to view the situation is that of minimizing ρ(π(θ|x), a). One should condition on what is known, namely x . . . . and average the utility over what is unknown, namely θ. The desire to minimize r(π, δ) would be deemed rather bizarre from this perspective."
In this passage, a is an action, x is data, θ is a state of nature, π(θ|x) is the posterior distribution on the state space, ρ is posterior loss with choice of action a, δ is a statistical decision function, π is the prior distribution on the state space, and r(π, δ) is the Bayes risk of δ.
I view Berger's normative statement to be overly enthusiastic for two distinct reasons. First, the statement does not address how decisions should be made when part of the decision is choice of a procedure for collection of data, as in experimental or sample design. Such decisions must be made ex ante, before collecting the data. Hence, frequentist consideration of the performance of decision functions across possible realizations of the data is inevitable. Berger recognizes this later, in his chapter on "Preposterior and Sequential Analysis."
Second, the Bayesian prescription for conditioning decision making on sample data presumes that the planner feels able to place a credible subjective prior distribution on the state space. However, Bayesians have long struggled to provide guidance on specification of priors and the matter continues to be controversial. See, for example, the spectrum of views regarding Bayesian analysis of randomized trials expressed by the authors and discussants of Spiegelhalter, Freedman, and Parmar (1994) . The controversy suggests that inability to express a credible prior is common in actual decision settings.
When one finds it difficult to assert a credible subjective distribution, Bayesians may suggest use of some default distribution, variously called a "reference" or "conventional" or "objective" prior; see, for example, Berger (2006) . However, there is no consensus on the prior that should play this role. The chosen prior matters for decision making.
Focus on Maximum Regret
Concern with specification of priors motivated Wald (1950) to study the minimax criterion. He wrote (p. 18): "a minimax solution seems, in general, to be a reasonable solution of the decision problem when an a priori distribution . . . . does not exist or is unknown to the experimenter."
I similarly am concerned with decision making in the absence of a subjective distribution on the state space. However, I have mainly measured the performance of SDFs by maximum regret rather than by minimum expected welfare. The maximin and MR criteria are sometimes confused with one another, but they are equivalent only in special cases, particularly when the value of optimal welfare is invariant across states of nature. The criteria obviously differ more generally. Whereas maximin considers only the worst outcome that an action may yield across states, MR considers the worst outcome relative to what is achievable in a given state of nature.
Practical and conceptual reasons motivate focus on maximum regret. From a practical perspective, it has been found that MMR decisions behave more reasonably than do maximin ones in the important context of treatment choice. In common settings of treatment choice with data from randomized trials, it has been found that the MMR rule is well approximated by the empirical success rule, which chooses the treatment with the highest observed average outcome in the trial; see Section 4 for further discussion. In contrast, the maximin criterion commonly ignores the trial data, whatever they may be. This was recognized verbally by Savage (1951) , who stated that the criterion is "ultrapessimistic" and wrote (p. 63): "it can lead to the absurd conclusion in some cases that no amount of relevant experimentation should deter the actor from behaving as though he were in complete ignorance." Savage did not flesh out this statement, but it is easy to show that this occurs with trial data. Manski (2004) provides a simple example.
The conceptual appeal of using maximum regret to measure performance is that maximum regret quantifies how lack of knowledge of the true state of nature diminishes the quality of decisions. While the term "maximum regret" has become standard in the literature, this term is a shorthand for the maximum sub-optimality of a decision criterion across the feasible states of nature. An SDF with small maximum regret is uniformly near-optimal across all states. This is a desirable property.
In a literature distinct from statistical decision theory, minimax regret has drawn diverse reactions from axiomatic decision theorists. In a famous early critique, Chernoff (1954) This passage is the totality of Chernoff's argument. He introspected and concluded that any reasonable decision criterion should always adhere to the IIA axiom, but he did not explain why he felt this way.
Chernoff's view has been endorsed by some modern axiomatic decision theorists, such as Binmore (2009).
On the other hand, Sen (1993) argued that adherence to axioms such as IIA does not per se provide a sound basis for evaluation of decision criteria. He asserted that consideration of the context of decision making is essential.
Manski (2011) also argues that adherence to the IIA axiom is not a virtue per se. What matters is how violation of the axiom affects welfare. I observed that the MMR violation of the IIA axiom does not yield choice of a dominated SDF. The MMR decision is always undominated when it is unique. There generically exists an undominated MMR decision when the criterion has multiple solutions. Hence, I
concluded that violation of the IIA axiom is not a sound rationale to dismiss minimax regret.
Binary Choice Problems
SDFs for binary choice problems are simple and interesting. They can always be viewed as Let us review the basic practices of classical hypothesis testing, developed by Neyman and Pearson (1928, 1933) . These tests view the hypotheses {s ∈ S a } and {s ∈ S b } asymmetrically, calling the former the null hypothesis and the latter the alternative. The sampling probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is correct is called the probability of a Type I error. A longstanding convention has been to restrict attention to tests in which the probability of a Type I error is no larger than a predetermined value α, usually 0.05, for all s ∈ S a . In the notation of statistical decision theory, one restricts attentions to SDFs c(·) for
Among tests that satisfy this restriction, Neyman-Pearson testing seeks ones that give small probability of rejecting the alternative hypothesis when it is correct, the probability of a Type II error.
However, it generally is not possible to attain small probability of a Type II error for all s ∈ S b . Letting S be a metric space, the probability of a Type II error typically approaches 1 − α as s ∈ S b nears the boundary of S a . See, for example, Manski and Tetenov (2016) , Figure 1 . Given this, the convention has been to restrict attention to states in S b that lie at least a specified distance from S a .
Let ρ be the metric measuring distance on S. Let ρ a > 0 be the specified minimum distance from S a .
In the notation of statistical decision theory, Neyman-Pearson testing seeks small values for the maximum
Expected Welfare of Tests
Decision theoretic evaluation of tests does not restrict attention to tests that yield a predetermined upper bound on the probability of a Type I error. Nor does it aim to minimize the maximum value of the probability of a Type II error when more than a specified minimum distance from the null hypothesis.
Wald's central idea, for binary choice as elsewhere. is to evaluate the performance of SDF c(·) in state s by the distribution of welfare that it yields across realizations of the sampling process. He first addressed hypothesis testing this way in Wald (1939) .
The welfare distribution in state s in a binary choice problem is Bernoulli, with mass points max 
The expression R c(·)s @|w(a, s) − w(b, s)| is the regret of c(·) in state s. Thus, regret is the product of the error probability and the magnitude of the welfare loss when an error occurs. . We approximate maximum regret by computing regret over a finite grid of states, thus discretizing the state space. Stoye (2009) shows that the MMR decision is the empirical success (ES) rule. This rule, which will be discussed more fully in Section 4, chooses a treatment that maximizes the average sample outcome in the trial. 
Practicalities
Statistical decision theory has breathtaking generality. It enables comparison of all SDFs whose risk functions exist. It applies to any sample size, without asymptotic approximations.
The state space may take any form. In Haavelmo's formalization of econometrics, S is a space of probability distributions that may describe the economic system under study. The state space may be finite dimensional or larger. The theory is applicable when unlimited data collection would point or partially identify the true state.
Given these features, one might anticipate that statistical decision theory would play a central role in modern statistics and econometrics. Notable contributions by statisticians emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, as described in the monographs of Ferguson (1967) and Berger (1985) . However, the early period of development of statistical decision theory largely closed by the 1970s, except for the conditional Bayes version of Bayesian theory. Conditional Bayes analysis has continued to develop, but as a self-contained field of study disconnected from Wald's frequentist idea of maximization of subjective average welfare.
Why did statistical decision theory lose momentum? One reason may have been diminishing interest in decision making as the motivation for analysis of sample data. Many modern statisticians and econometricians view the objective of empirical research as inference for scientific understanding, rather than use of data in decision making. Another reason may have been the technical difficulty of the subject.
Wald's ideas are easy to describe abstractly, but they can be difficult to apply in practice.
Consider the mathematical problems (4) Recently, Manski (2017, 2019) have derived analytical findings on the maximum regret of certain tractable point predictors of bounded outcomes with data from random samples when some outcomes are missing. See Section 3.4 below for further discussion.
In another domain, econometricians have proved a sequence of analytical findings on tractable decision rules for treatment choice with data from a randomized experiment. See Manski (2004 Manski ( , 2005 Manski ( , 2007 , Porter (2009, 2019) , Stoye (2009 Stoye ( , 2012 , Tetenov (2016, 2019) , and Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018) . This decision problem will be discussed further in Section 4.
Numerical computation often was infeasible when statistical decision theory developed in the 1940s, but it has become increasingly possible since then. Modern conditional Bayes analysis has increasingly moved away from use of conjugate priors to numerical computation of posterior distributions.
Numerical determination of some maximin and MMR decisions has also become feasible. For example, Tetenov (2016, 2019) random-sample data when some outcomes are missing; see Section 3.4 for further discussion.
3. Decision Making with Models 3.1. Basic Ideas I stated at the outset that standard decision theory begins with a planner who "specifies a state space listing the states that he considers possible." Thus, the state space should include all states that the planner believes feasible and no others. The state space may be a large set that is difficult to contemplate in its entirety. Hence, it is common to make decisions using a model.
The word "model" is commonly used informally to connote a simplification or approximation of reality. Formally, a model specifies an alternative to the state space. Thus, model m replaces S with a model space S m . A planner using a model acts as if the model space is the state space. For example, the planner might solve problem (4), (5), or (6) with S m replacing S. Section 3.2 discusses other possibilities.
The states contained in a model space may or may not be elements of the state space. The statistician George Box famously wrote (Box, 1979) : "All models are wrong, but some are useful." The phrase "all models are wrong" indicates that Box was thinking of models that simplify or approximate reality in a way that one believes could not possibly be correct; then S m ∩ S = Ø. On the other hand, researchers often use models that they believe could possibly be correct but that are not necessarily so; then S m ⊂ S.
Economists have long used models of the second type, ones they believe could be correct but are not necessarily so. A persistent concern of econometric theory has been to determine when such models have implications that may potentially be inconsistent with observable data. These models are called testable, refutable, or over-identified.
Working within the paradigm of Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing, econometricians have developed specification tests which take the null hypothesis to be that the model is correct and the alternative to be that it is incorrect. Formally, the null is {s Thus, statistical decision theory enables one to operationalize Box=s assertion that some models are useful. Useful model-based decision rules yield acceptably high state-dependent expected welfare across the state space, relative to what is possible in principle. From this perspective, one should not make an abstract assertion that a model is or is not useful. Usefulness depends on the decision context.
Research on Robust Decisions
The remainder of this paper fleshes out the above basic ideas on evaluation of model-based decisions. Before then, I juxtapose these ideas with those expressed in research on robust decisions. This includes, for example, the econometric work of Hansen, Sargent, and collaborators on robust macroeconomic modeling (e.g., Sargent, 2001, 2008) .
The idea that the usefulness of a model depends on the decision context has been formalized in research on robust decisions, but in a different manner than I do here. The broad idea is well-stated in a review article by Watson and Holmes (2016) , who write (p. 466):
"Statisticians are taught from an early stage that "essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful" (Box and Draper, 1987) . By "wrong" we will take to mean misspecified and by "useful"
we will take to mean helpful for aiding actions (taking decisions), or rather a model is not useful if it does not aid any decision."
However, research on robust decisions proceeds in a different manner than the application of statistical decision theory in the present paper.
Work on robustness begins with specification of an initial model rather than a state space.
Typically, the initial model is relatively simple and convenient; hence, the initial model space is relatively small. After specifying an initial model, a researcher may be concerned that it is only an approximation rather than completely correct. To recognize this possibility, the researcher enlarges the initial model space locally, using a specified metric to generate a neighborhood of the initial space. Solving problem (9) is often simpler than solving problems (4) through (6). Selecting a point estimate and using it to maximize welfare is easier than performing the nested operations requires to solve problems (4) through (6). However, computational appeal does not suffice to justify this approach to decision making.
To motivate as-if optimization, econometricians often cite limit theorems of asymptotic theory that hold if the model is correct. 
As-If Optimization with Analog Estimates
Econometric research from Haavelmo onward has focused to a considerable degree on a class of problems that connect the state space and the sampling distribution in a simple way. These are problems in which states are probability distributions and the data are a random sample drawn from the true distribution.
In such problems, a natural form of as-if optimization is to act as if the empirical distribution of the data is the true population distribution. Thus, one specifies the model space as the set of all possible empirical distributions and uses the observed empirical distribution as the point estimate of the true state. Goldberger (1968) estimates the population distribution and has further desirable asymptotic properties. This suggests decision making using the empirical distribution as if it were the true population distribution.
As-If Decisions with Set Estimates
As-if optimization uses data to compute a point estimate of the true state of nature and chooses an action that optimizes welfare as if this estimate is accurate. An obvious, but rarely applied, extension is to use data to compute a set-valued estimate of the true state and then act as if the set estimate is accurate.
Whereas a point estimate s(·) maps data into an element of S m , a set estimate S(·) maps data into a subset of S m . For example, S(·) could be a confidence set reported by researchers.
Given data ψ, one could act as if the state space is S(ψ) rather than the larger set S. Specifically, one could solve these data-dependent versions of problems (1) through (3):
In the case of (1'), π(ψ) is a subjective distribution on the set S(ψ).
These as-if problems are generally easier to solve than are problems (4) to (6). The as-if problems fix ψ and select one action c, whereas problems (4) to (6) (2000) uses asymptotic considerations to suggest this type of as-if decision making and presents an application.
Prediction with Sample Data
A familiar case of as-if optimization occurs when states are distributions for a real random variable and the decision problem is to predict the value of a realization drawn from the true distribution. When welfare is measured by square and absolute loss, the best predictors are well-known to be the population mean and median. When the true distribution is not known but data from a random sample are observed, the analogy principle suggests use of the sample average and median as predictors.
In his final chapter on "Problems of Prediction," Haavelmo (1944) Letting E 2 denote a predictor function and (x 1 , x 2 , . . , , x N ) the sample data, he wrote (p. 109): "We have to choose E 2 as a function of x 1 , x 2 , . . , , x N , and we should, naturally, try to choose E 2 (x 1 , x 2 , . . , , x N ) in such a way that r (the 'risk') becomes as small as possible." But he immediately recognized that there generally does not exist a predictor function that minimizes risk across all states of nature. Hence, he went on to suggest a feasible approach. I quote in full this key passage, which uses the notation Ω 1 to denote the state space (p. 116):
"In general, however, we may expect that no uniformly best prediction function exists.
Then we have to introduce some additional principles in order to choose a prediction function. We may then, first, obviously disregard all those prediction functions that are such that there exists another prediction function that makes r smaller for every member of Ω 1 . If this is not the case we call the prediction function considered an admissible prediction function. To choose between several admissible prediction functions we might adopt the following principle, introduced by Wald: For every admissible prediction function E 2 the 'risk' r is a function of the true distribution p. Consider that prediction function E 2 , among the admissible ones, for which the largest value of r is at a minimum (i.e., smaller than or at most equal to the largest value of r for any other admissible E 2 ). Such a prediction function, if it exists, may be said to be the least risky among the admissible prediction functions."
Thus, following Wald, Haavelmo suggested elimination of inadmissible predictors followed by choice of a minimax predictor among those that are admissible.
It may be that econometrics would have progressed to make productive use of statistical decision theory if Haavelmo had been able to pursue the above idea further. However, in his next section on "Some
Practical Suggestions for the Derivation of Prediction Formulae," he cautioned regarding the practicality of the idea, writing (p. 111): "The apparatus set up in the preceding section, although simple in principle, will in general involve considerable mathematical problems and heavy algebra."
Aiming for tractability, Haavelmo went on to sketch an example of as-if optimization that chooses an action using a maximum likelihood estimate of a specific finite-dimensional parametric model. He noted that one could study the state-dependent risk of the resulting SDF, but he did not provide any analysis. With this, his chapter on prediction ended. Thus, Haavelmo initiated econometric consideration of statistical decision theory but, stymied by computational intractability, he found himself unable to follow through.
Nor did other econometricians apply statistical decision theory to prediction in the period after publication of Haavelmo (1944) . I observed earlier that no contribution in Cowles Monograph 10 mentioned statistical decision theory and only one did so briefly in Cowles 14. Cowles 10 and 14 contain several chapters by Haavelmo and by Wald, but these concern different subjects. The only mention in Cowles 14 appeared in Koopmans and Hood (1953) . Considering "The Purpose of Estimation," they wrote (p. 127):
"if a direct prediction problem . . . . can be isolated and specified, the choice of a method of estimation should be discussed in terms of desired properties of the joint distribution of the prediction(s) made and the realized values(s) of the variables(s) predicted. In particular, in a precisely defined prediction problem of this type, one may know the consequence of various possible errors of prediction and would then be able to use predictors minimizing the mathematical expectation of losses due to such errors. Abraham Wald [1939 Wald [ , 1945 Wald [ , 1950c , among others, has proposed methods of statistical decision-making designed to accomplish this."
However, they immediately went on to state that neither they nor the other contributors to Cowles 14 apply statistical decision theory to prediction. They wrote (p. 127):
"The more classical methods of estimation applied in this volume are not as closely tailored to any one particular prediction problem. Directed to the estimation of structural parameters rather than values of endogenous variables, they yield estimates that can be regarded as raw materials, to be processed further into solutions of a wide variety of prediction problems---in particular, problems involving prediction of the effects of known changes in structure."
This passage expresses the broad thinking that econometricians have used to motivate as-if optimization.
Prediction under Square Loss
Haavelmo discussed application of statistical decision theory to prediction briefly and abstractly.
Subsequent research has focused on the special case of square loss. In this case, the risk of a candidate predictor using sample data is the sum of the population variance of the outcome and the mean square error (MSE) of the predictor as an estimate of the mean outcome. The regret of a predictor is its MSE as an estimate of the mean. An MMR predictor minimizes maximum mean square error. MMR prediction of the outcome is equivalent to minimax estimation of the population mean.
Among the earliest important practical findings of statistical decision theory was reported by Hodges and Lehman (1950) . They derived the MMR predictor under square loss with data from a random sample, when the outcome has known bounded range and all sample data are observed. They assumed no knowledge of the outcome distribution beyond its bounded support. Normalizing the support to be the interval [0, 1], they proved that the MMR predictor is (μ N √N + ½)/(√N + 1), where N is sample size and μ N is the sample average outcome. Manski (2017, 2019) have recently extended study of prediction of a bounded outcome under square loss to settings in which a random sample is drawn but some realized outcomes are unobserved. It is challenging to determine the MMR predictor when some data are missing. Seeking an approach that is both tractable and reasonable, the paper studies as-if MMR prediction. The analysis assumes knowledge of the fraction of the population with missing data, but it assumes no knowledge of the distributions of observed and missing outcomes beyond their bounded support. It uses the empirical distribution of the observed sample data as if it were the population distribution of observable outcomes.
Prediction with Missing Data
In the absence of knowledge of the distribution of missing outcomes, the population mean outcome is partially identified when the outcome is bounded. Its identification region is an easy-to-compute interval derived in Manski (1989) . If this interval were known, the MMR predictor would be its midpoint. The identification interval is not known with sample data, but one can compute its sample analog and use the midpoint of the sample-analog interval as the predictor.
This midpoint predictor is easy to compute. Its maximum regret is shown to have a simple form.
Let δ indicate the observability of an outcome. Let P(δ = 1) and P(δ = 0) denote the fractions of the population whose outcomes are and are not observable. Let N be the number of observed sample outcomes, which is fixed rather than random under the assumed survey design. The paper proves that the maximum regret of the midpoint predictor is ¼[P(δ = 1)
The analysis in Dominitz and Manski (2017) presumes a state space that places no restrictions on the distributions of observable and unobservable outcomes. Researchers often assume that data are missing at random. That is, they invoke a model space in which the distributions of observable and unobservable outcomes are the same. They then use the sample average of observed outcomes as the predictor. Dominitz and Manski caution against this application of modeling when the distributions of observable and unobservable outcomes may differ arbitrarily. They show that the maximum regret of the model-based predictor necessarily exceeds that of the midpoint predictor, in some cases substantially so.
Numerical Computation of Maximum Regret in Prediction with Missing Data
The analytical finding on the maximum regret of the midpoint predictor described above assumes knowledge of the fraction of the population with missing data. A midpoint predictor remains easy to compute when P(δ = 0) is not known and instead is estimated by its sample analog. In this case, derivation of an analytical expression for maximum regret does not seem possible, but numerical computation is tractable. I summarize here. This demonstrate how advances in numerical analysis now enable applications of statistical decision theory that were impractical when Haavelmo and Wald made their contributions.
Manski and Tabord-Meehan (2017) describe an algorithm coded in STATA for numerical computation of the maximum regret of the midpoint predictor and other user-specified predictors in the setting of Dominitz and Manski (2017) . The program, named wald_mse, does not require knowledge of the population fraction of missing data. Instead, P(δ = 0) may be estimated by its sample analog.
Letting y denote the outcome of interest, the state space has the form [P s (y|δ = 1), P s (y|δ = 0), P s (δ = 0)], s 0 S]. An important feature of wald_mse is that the user can specify the state space flexibly. For example, the user may assume that nonresponse will be no higher than 80% or that the mean value of the outcome for nonresponders will be no lower than 0.5. The user may impose no restrictions connecting the two outcome distributions P s (y|δ = 1) and P s (y|δ = 0), or he may bound the difference between these distributions.
In any given state s, the algorithm uses Monte Carlo integration to approximate the MSE of the user-specified predictor. The quality of the approximation is controlled by user specification of the number of pseudo realizations of (y, δ) that are drawn. Increasing the number yields a better approximation at the cost of longer computation time.
The algorithm embodies two approaches to maximize MSE across the state space, one applicable when the outcome is binary and the other when the outcome has a continuous distribution. When y is binary, P s (y|δ = 1), P s (y|δ = 0), and P s (δ = 0) are all Bernoulli distributions. The algorithm approximates the state space by a finite grid over the possible Bernoulli parameters for each distribution. It then maximizes MSE over the grid. The user controls the quality of the approximation to the state space by specifying the density of the grid. Increasing the density yields a better approximation at the cost of longer computation time.
When y is continuous, the algorithm presumes that P s (y|δ = 1) and P s (y|δ = 0) are Beta distributions, provides new analysis of its performance with observational data. In both cases, the analysis assumes that treatment outcomes have known bounded range but otherwise places no restrictions on the distribution of treatment response. Section 4.4 relates the analysis to the early literature in econometrics.
Maximum Regret of the ES Rule with Trial Data
Consider a classical randomized trial, where all subjects comply with assigned treatments and all sample realized outcomes are observed. Then the only feasible states of nature are ones in which, for each treatment, the population distribution of counterfactual outcomes equals that of realized outcomes.
Study of the regret performance of the ES rule with trial data was initiated by Manski (2004) , who used a large-deviations inequality for sample averages of bounded outcomes to derive an upper bound on maximum regret in problems of choice between two treatments. Subsequently, Stoye (2009) showed that in trials with moderate sample size, the ES rule either exactly or approximately minimizes maximum regret in cases with two treatments and a balanced design. Hirano and Porter (2009) showed that the ES rule is asymptotically optimal in a formal decision-theoretic sense.
Considering problems with multiple treatments or unbalanced designs, Manski and Tetenov (2016) use large deviations inequalities for sample averages of bounded outcomes to obtain upper bounds on the maximum regret of the ES rule. Their Proposition 1 extends the early finding of Manski (2004) from two to multiple treatments. Proposition 2 derives a new large-deviations bound for multiple treatments.
Let L be the number of treatment arms and let V be the range of the bounded outcome. When the trial has a balanced design, with n subjects per treatment arm, the bounds on maximum regret proved in Propositions 1 and 2 have particularly simple forms, being
Result (10) provides a tighter bound than (11) for two or three treatments. Result (11) gives a tighter bound for four or more treatments. With finite sample data, the state-dependent error probabilities for the ES rule do not have simple explicit forms, but they may be computed numerically by Monte Carlo integration. The maximum regret of the ES rule can be approximated by computing regret on a grid that discretizes the state space. An algorithm akin to that of Manski and Tabord-Meehan (2017) can be developed to perform the computations. 
With choice of b, maximum regret is
The difference between these maximum-regret expressions is
Treatment b (a) uniquely minimizes maximum regret if the value of (14) is positive (negative). The treatments yield the same maximum regret if the value of (14) is zero. (14) is
Maximum Regret of the ES
Hence, treatment b uniquely minimizes maximum regret if ε > k(1 − 2m)/(½ − k) and treatment a does so (14) is
Hence, treatment b uniquely minimizes maximum regret if ε > k(2m − 1)/(½ + k) and treatment a does so if ε < k(2m − 1)/(½ + k). A sufficient condition for the former result is that m ≤ ½. The latter result occurs if m > ½, k is sufficiently large, and ε is sufficiently small. Recall Box's statement that a model may be wrong but useful. The above derivation shows that using the model of random treatment selection to motivate the ES rule minimizes maximum regret when similar fractions of the population receive each treatment and/or the treatments differ greatly in empirical success. However, it maximizes maximum regret when treatment shares are sufficiently different and the treatments have sufficiently similar empirical success. Thus, the model is useful for treatment choice in some contexts but is harmful in others. To compare these alternative mandates, we took the outcome of interest to be recidivism in the two-year period following sentencing. Let y = 1 if an offender commits no new offense and y = 0 otherwise.
No new offense was interpreted as treatment success, and commission of a new offense was interpreted as failure.
We obtained data on the sentences received and the recidivism outcomes realized by all male offenders in Utah who were born from 1970 through 1974 and who were convicted of offenses before they reached age 16. The Utah data reveal that 11 percent of the offenders were sentenced to confinement and that 23 percent of these persons did not offend again in the two years following sentencing. The remaining 89 percent were sentenced to non-confinement and 41 percent of these persons did not offend again. Hence, treatment a minimizes maximum regret.
One might assume that Utah judges have sentenced offenders randomly to treatments and b. One consequently might use the ES rule to choose between the two. Given that 0.41 > 0.23, the result is choice of treatment b. Thus, in this setting, the ES rule selects the treatment that is inferior from the minimaxregret perspective.
Analysis of Treatment Response and Study of Systems of Jointly Determined Variables
The terminology "analysis of treatment response" has become widespread in empirical microeconomics since the 1990s, but it does not appear in early writing on econometrics. At time of Haavelmo (1944) , a central focus was identification and estimation of models of systems of jointly determined variables. An important objective was to use estimated models to predict the impacts of contemplated public policies. Using further notation to denote realized treatments and outcomes, it is easy to see that analysis of treatment response lies within this longstanding concern of econometrics. Early econometricians analyzed data on realized treatments and outcomes in settings where treatments are chosen purposefully rather than randomly. Haavelmo (1944) Whichever version of the model is assumed, it has been common to use the resulting value of β to recommend a treatment, namely treatment a if β < 0 and b if β > 0. Applied researchers have long recognized that the assumed model may be incorrect, but the econometric literature has not shown how to evaluate the consequences of using incorrect models to make decisions. Statistical decision theory does so.
Conclusion
To reiterate the central theme of this paper, use of statistical decision theory to evaluate econometric models is conceptually coherent and simple. A planner specifies a state space listing all the states of nature deemed feasible. One evaluates the performance of any contemplated SDF by the state-dependent vector of expected welfare that it yields. Decisions made using models are evaluated in this manner. Statistical decision theory evaluates model-based decision rules by their performance across the state space, not across the model space.
The primary challenge to use of statistical decision theory in practice is computational. Recall that, in his discussion sketching application of statistical decision theory to prediction, Haavelmo (1944) remarked that such application (p. 111): "although simple in principle, will in general involve considerable mathematical problems and heavy algebra."
Many mathematical operations that were infeasible in 1944 are tractable now, as a result of advances in analytical methods and numerical computation. Hence, it has increasingly become possible to use statistical decision theory when performing econometric research that aims to inform decision making.
Future advances in analysis and numerical computation should continue to expand the scope of applications.
